Thursday, March 8, 2012
On what factors is T&D loss dependent
1. HT:LT consumer mix
2. Per capita consumption of HT and LT consumers
3. Geographical spread
4. Load density
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
Highway Norms - Again some changes
- Primary reason would be the traffic projections figures assumed by each bidder. The lowest bidder would have very high traffic projections for the same road.
- The first bidder might actually be undercutting, in order to spruce up his order book and might actually make lower or negative margins in some cases. If he decides on the other hand not to take a hit on his margins, he will have to lower the quality of construction which is not good in the long run. But can the bidder actually play around with the quality of the roads?Actually NO, there are performance guarantee bonds that the bidder signs and there are periodic assessment and checks as part of the progress payments received by the bidder for the value of contract completed by him. In case the NHAI is not satisfied with the quality of road, the can invoke the performance guarantee bond and terminate the contract.
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
Continuous change in highway bidding norms
According to the National Highway Builders Federation "The new policy will prevent aggressive bidding by some contractors, who win projects just to spruce up their order books, but then struggle, while tying up the funds.
"The NHAI has taken the right move, as companies cannot delay projects any longer. This will help them keep a check on construction firms, which have too many projects in hand and also achieve the 20 km per day target" - E sudhir Reddy IVRCL
Developers said there are many formalities to handle even before one can start raising funds for a project. After a letter of award is given, it takes 30-45 days to form a special purpose vehicle (SPV). After presenting the SPV document, the concession agreement has to be put through. Only after which is the developer allowed to proceed for financial closure. This process takes around three months. After necessary approvals are in place, companies approach banks for funds. Banks appraise the project and sign loan agreements, and this could take anywhere between two and three months.
On an average, financial closure of a road project takes around five to six months. It can go up to nine months for a larger-sized project.
'financial closure' is defined as fulfilment of all conditions precedent to the initial availability of funds under the financing agreements.The phrase 'conditions precedent' refers to commitments to be met by the developer and by NHAI. "These are the conditions to be fulfilled prior to when you can start working on a project. These can be land acquisition, rehabilitation, and environmental clearances,". While the developer's responsibility will be arranging for shareholders' funds, setting up an escrow account; NHAI deals with the necessary state support required for the project in terms of clearances and land acquisition.
New Norms - 26th April 2010
The changes include linking the technical and financial scores of large firms in direct proportion to the extent of their equity participation in the bidding consortium that will execute the project. This step was adopted by the Government to prevent name-lending by large firms, wherein smaller companies tied up with large firms only with an eye to beef up the consortium's technical score. This, in turn, helped the consortium bid for larger projects.
Also, the technical score of only those firms will be counted who have over 26 per cent equity participation in a project.
"The consortium would provide an undertaking to NHAI that the EPC works of the project will be executed by such contractors who have completed at least a single package of over 20 per cent of TPC or Rs 500 crore, whichever is less."
The consortium will share the names of contractors involved and will also have to take prior permission from NHAI if the contractor is changed.
Additionally, the Ministry has given approval to changes which require higher net-worth criteria. In the revised norms, NHAI has increased the net-worth required for participating in projects over Rs 2,000 crore. Earlier, the net worth clause was flat 25 per cent of the total project cost for all the projects.
Now, the projects with a total cost of Rs 2,000-3,000 crore will attract a total net worth criteria of Rs 500 crore plus 50 per cent of the cost above Rs 2,000 crore. So, for bidding for a project with estimated cost of Rs 2800 crore, the bidder's net worth has to be Rs 900 crore.
The criteria becomes further stringent for projects of above Rs 3,000 crore, where the concessionaire has to have a net worth of Rs 1,000 crore plus 100 per cent of the cost above Rs 3,000 crore. For example, any concessionaire bidding for a project worth Rs 4,000 crore, must have a net worth of Rs 2,000 crore.
Additionally, the financial closure criterion has also been made more stringent for large projects. If a company has won two projects of over Rs 3,000 crore for which it has not attained financial closure, then it cannot submit financial bids for new projects.
The current norms allow highway developers to achieve financial closure six months after signing the concession agreement between NHAI and the project developer. For many projects, the time difference between the date of LoA issuance and the concession agreement is as high as six months.This move is different from an earlier attempt of the Government to limit the number of bidders to the top four-five technically qualifying players — a move that was quashed subsequently.
"A bidder shall not be eligible for bidding if, as on bid due date, the bidder, its member or associate was, either by itself or as member of a consortium has been declared by the authority as the selected bidder for undertaking three or more projects and the bidder is yet to achieve financial closure. A bidder shall be considered as declared selected bidder for the projects of NHAI, where the letter of award (LoA) has been issued."
Friday, March 26, 2010
Gas pricing in India
- Till 1970's the prices were suggested by expert committes
- In early 1970's ONGC set gas prices on a negotiated basis depending on the ability of the player to pay resulting in different prices for different consumer segments.
- In mid 1970's prices were determined by the producers themselves, based on thermal equivalence of substitute fuels and opportunity cost to the consumer
- In 1986 govt decided to fix UNIFORM prices year to year basis
- Policy followed till 1991
- From 1 Jan 1992, prices of NG were fixed for a period of 4 years to 31 dec 1995 based on the recommendation of the Kelkar committee.
- 1992 - 1000 - 1550
- 1993 - 1000 - 1650
- 1994 - 1000 - 1750
- 1995 - 1000 - 1850
- Post december 1995, price fixed at 1850 and 1000 for north eastern states.
- In January 1995, set up shankar committee which suggested that price should be related to the long run average cost cost of prouduction. The price came at Rs. 1854, the committee fixed the price at 1800 with a provision to increase price by 200-250 per scm per year. Government while accepting the numbers, related it to the price parity with fuel oils and annouced the pricing policy as a % of fuel oil. While the prices proposed were the same as suggested by the committee, the principles was changed.
- IN 1998-99, price linkage was 65% of the international price basket
- in 1999-00 price linkage was 75%
- in 2000 price linkage was at 75% but the government introduced celings on prices of Rs. 2150, 2850 on a quarterly basis
- In december 2001,MONPG plans to raise natural gas prices and bring linkage at 100% and double the gas celieing price.
- By 2002 the consumer price reached Rs. 2850
- Initial proposal was to raise prices gradually from Jan 2003, but this has been deferred due to assembly elections in gujarat. Incresased and completely deregulated by october 2003.
Thursday, March 25, 2010
Prices of Natural gas
- KG D6
- APM - Others
- APM - NE
- PMT
- LNG- Spot
- LNG - Long term
- The source from which the gas allocation has happened
- The sector to which the company belongs
- The transportation sector and and small consumers (drawing less than 0.05mmscmd) pay Rs.3840/tscm while all other industrial consumers pay Rs. 8675/tscm and the power and fertilizers sector pay Rs. 3200/tscm. These gas prices have been in effect since June 6.2006. The other sector includes customers like petrochemicals, sponge iron and ceramics.
Landed price of gas
Tuesday, March 23, 2010
Pricing Mechanism in India
- The government policy approach on pricing petroleum products since 1970s has moved between cost-based pricing and import parity pricing (IPP). But, since 2004, the government has been setting consumer prices of petrol, diesel, domestic LPG and PDS kerosene on ad hoc basis so as to ensure petroleum price stability in the country in the face of extreme volatility in international oil markets. Yet, each policy regime gave rise to serious imbalances and change was called for. In order to establish a viable and sustainable price system for the petroleum products, it is important to assess the earlier pricing systems and draw some lessons
- In the past, the first major policy shift in pricing of petroleum products occurred in 1976, when the Government replaced IPP of the 1960s by cost-plus pricing. This came to be known as Administered Pricing Mechanism (APM), which was applied to the entire oil sector. The objective of the government was to shield the Indian economy from the high and volatile oil prices generated by the first Oil Shock in 1973-74. APM ran its course for three decades and was completely abandoned in April 2002. The major weakness of APM was that it did not induce competition in the marketplace, so it did not fulfill the consumer’s interest for better products and services. Nor did it enable domestic oil companies to generate adequate financial resources for project development and capacity addition in this crucial sector
- The petroleum pricing reforms analysed above, except APM, did not have any mechanism to manage extreme volatility in oil prices. Even the effectiveness of APM as a self balancing mechanism was based on the premise that any increase in the costs of PSU oil companies on account of crude oil production, import, refining and marketing based on the predetermined formula should be fully reflected in the consumer prices
- During April 2002 to January 2004 oil companies changed the domestic consumer prices of petrol and diesel and domestic LPG based on market factors. However, kerosene price was not changed. As oil prices started moving upward in 2004, the question of smoothing the volatility in international prices assumed importance
- The period from 2004 to 2008 witnessed three distinct policy phases to address oil price volatility:
- First, the Government devised a price band mechanism in July 2004. The Government gave limited freedom to oil marketing companies to revise retail prices within a band of +/-10% of the mean of rolling average of last 12 months and last 3 months of international C&F prices. In case of international prices breaching this band, the matter would be taken up with Ministry of Finance for modulation in excise duty rates. The above price band was operated only once effective 1st August 2004 when prices of petrol and diesel were increased by Rs.1.10 per litre and Rs.1.42 per litre, respectively. However, as oil prices rose sharply and there was uncertainty in international oil markets, the price band mechanism was abandoned
- In October 2005, the Government constituted the Rangarajan Committee to examine the pricing and taxation of petroleum products with a view to stabilizing their prices and establishing transparent mechanism for autonomous adjustment of prices by the oil companies. The Committee recommended a formula of trade parity pricing (TPP) for petrol and diesel at refinery level as well as at retail level. The formula was a weighted average of import parity and export parity prices, in which the percentage share of import/export of these products provided the weights. The Committee suggested that these TPP prices should serve as indicative ceilings within which the marketing companies would have flexibility to fix the actual retail prices of petrol and diesel. As regards subsidies, the Committee recommended elimination of subsidy on LPG and its restriction of kerosene subsidy to BPL families. (c) The Government implemented switching over to TPP and rationalised taxes on crude oil, petrol and diesel, but could not implement rationalization of subsidies and other changes recommended by the Committee. Even TPP was confined to the refinery level and the retail prices of petrol, diesel, domestic LPG and PDS Kerosene fixed by the Government remained below their TPP levels.


